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Abstract
The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their pref-
erences is a central tenet in economics. This assumption is often justiﬁed either
formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we
show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a
player’s actual payoﬀs, some degree of this distortion is beneﬁcial to the player be-
cause of the resulting eﬀect on opponents’ play. Consequently, such distortions will
not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoﬀ-monotonic selection
dynamics, in which agents with higher actual payoﬀs proliferate at the expense
of less successful agents. In particular, under any such selection dynamics, the
population will not converge to payoﬀ-maximizing behavior. We also show that
payoﬀ-maximizing behavior need not prevail even when preferences are imperfectly
observed.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a
central tenet in economics. This assumption is often justiﬁed either formally or informally
by appealing to evolutionary arguments. For example, in their classic work, Alchian
(1950) and Friedman (1953) argue that proﬁt maximization is a reasonable assumption
for characterizing outcomes in competitive markets because only ﬁrms behaving in a
manner consistent with proﬁt maximization will survive in the long run. Under this
argument, ﬁr m sf a i l i n gt oa c ts oa st om a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts will be driven out of the market
by more proﬁtable rivals, even if none of these ﬁrms deliberately maximizes proﬁts or is
even aware of its cost or revenue functions. Similar arguments that consumers behave
“as if” maximizing preferences due to myriad market forces that exploit non-optimal
behavior are pervasive. More recently, Sandroni (2000) gives such a justiﬁcation for
rational expectations equilibria, showing that a market populated by agents who initially
diﬀer in the accuracy of their predictions will nonetheless converge to a competitive
rational expectations equilibrium as those agents who make inaccurate predictions are
driven out of the market by those who are more accurate.
In contrast, this paper shows that in almost every strategic interaction, payoﬀ max-
imization cannot be justiﬁed by appealing to evolutionary arguments. Speciﬁcally, we
show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a player’s
actual payoﬀs, some degree of this distortion is beneﬁcial to the player because of the
resulting eﬀect on opponents’ play. Consequently, we show that such distortions will
not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoﬀ-monotonic selection dy-
namics, in which agents with higher actual payoﬀs proliferate at the expense of less
successful agents. In particular, under any such selection dynamics, the population will
not converge to payoﬀ maximizing behavior.
The idea that in strategic situations players may gain an advantage from having an ob-
jective function diﬀerent from actual payoﬀ maximization dates back at least to Schelling
(1960), and his discussion of the commitment value of decision rules. Related ideas run
through work ranging from Stackelberg’s (1934) classic work on timing in oligopoly to
the theories of reputation in Kreps and Wilson (1982), and Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
For similar reasons, Frank (1987, 1988) argues that emotions may be a beneﬁcial commit-
ment device. Recently, a large and growing literature has emerged that formalizes some
of these ideas by explicitly studying the evolution of preferences. This work shows that in
strategic interactions, a wide array of distortions of actual payoﬀs, representing features
such as altruism, spite, overconﬁdence, fairness, and reciprocity, that bias individuals’
objectives away from actual payoﬀ maximization, may be evolutionarily stable.1
1For a brief overview of this literature, see Samuelson (2001). Examples include Güth and Yaari
(1992), Huck and Oechssler (1999), Fershtman and Weiss (1997, 1998), Fershtman and Heifetz (2002),
Rotemberg (1994), Bester and Güth (1998), Possajennikov (2000), Bolle (2000), Bergman and Bergman
(2000), Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000a, 2000b), Guttman (2000), Sethi and Somanathan (2001), Kyle
and Wang (1997), Benos (1998), Heifetz and Segev (2003), and Heifetz, Segev and Talley (2004).
2Unlike most standard evolutionary game theory, in which individuals are essentially
treated as “machines” programmed to play a speciﬁc action, the work on the evolution
of preferences treats individuals as decision makers who choose actions to maximize
their preferences, and then studies how the distribution of these preferences evolves over
time. Preferences that are distortions of true payoﬀs — or “dispositions” — drive a wedge
between an individual’s objectives and actual payoﬀs. Dispositions may nonetheless
be evolutionarily stable because the resulting bias in a player’s objectives may induce
favorable behavior in rivals that may more than compensate for the loss stemming from
departures from actual payoﬀ maximization. Thus the literature on the evolution of
preferences illustrates the point that in a variety of strategic interactions, individuals who
fail to maximize their true payoﬀs due to the bias created by various dispositions may
actually end up with higher payoﬀs than individuals who are unbiased. Such beneﬁcial
dispositions would then not be weeded out by any selection dynamics in which more
successful behavior proliferates at the expense of less successful behavior, where success
is measured in terms of actual payoﬀs.
Much of the work on the evolution of preferences, however, focuses on speciﬁc kinds of
dispositions, such as altruism or reciprocity, and addresses these questions using speciﬁc
functional forms for both the individuals’ payoﬀs and dispositions. Such results then
provide conditions on the parameters of the particular model at hand that guarantee
that some non-zero degree of this disposition will survive evolutionary pressures. Our
results generalize this work in an important way by isolating the general principle driving
these results and by showing that the evolutionary emergence of dispositions is in fact
generic.
Our genericity results are fairly intuitive. Having a disposition aﬀects a player’s payoﬀ
in two ways: directly, through the player’s own actions, and indirectly, by inﬂuencing
other players’ actions. A crucial observation is that a some small nonzero degree of
disposition leads to a slight deviation from payoﬀ-optimizing behavior, and therefore has
only a negligible direct eﬀect on the player’s payoﬀ. The crux of our argument is that for
generic combinations of games and dispositions, the indirect eﬀect on the player’s payoﬀ
resulting from such a small degree of the disposition is not negligible. Interestingly, this
result also implies that, generically, players can gain strategic advantage over opponents
by hiring delegates whose preferences diﬀer from theirs to play the game on their behalf.
This implies in turn that earlier results obtained in the strategic delegation literature in
the context of speciﬁc models (e.g. Green 1992; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Fershtman,
Judd and Kalai 1991;K a t z1991) are in fact generic.
Central to our results are appropriate parameterizations of games and dispositions.
Since our analysis is based on ﬁrst-order conditions, we restrict attention to pure-strategy
equilibria in games with continuous action sets. Because we are interested in the evo-
lutionary viability of payoﬀ maximization rather than the emergence of one particular
type of bias, such as altruism or overconﬁdence, we consider a disposition to encompass
a family of biases indexed by a degree that can be positive, negative, or zero. In this
3framework a zero degree means that the player is unbiased and interested in maximizing
his actual payoﬀ. The interpretation of a positive or negative degree will typically de-
pend on the speciﬁcation of the given family of dispositions; for example, the disposition
might reﬂect other-regarding preferences, with a positive degree corresponding to altru-
ism and a negative degree corresponding to spite. For a generic set of payoﬀ functions
and dispositions, however, some nonzero degree of the disposition has a positive indirect
eﬀect. This guarantees that such dispositions will not be eliminated from the population
under any payoﬀ monotonic selection dynamics. We ﬁrst prove this result for a class of
ﬁnite-dimensional manifolds of payoﬀ and disposition functions, and then generalize it
to the inﬁnite-dimensional families of all payoﬀ and disposition functions.
Our main results are derived under the assumption that players’ preferences are per-
fectly observable. We then show that dispositions may remain evolutionarily viable even
when the players’ preferences are only imperfectly observed. Here the natural solution
concept given the imperfect observability of preferences is Bayesian equilibrium. This
highlights a technical obstacle surrounding results about the evolutionary viability of
dispositions. Unlike Nash equilibria with perfect observability, Bayesian equilibria are
typically not locally unique (see, e.g., Leininger, Linhart, and Radner, 1989). In such
cases an equilibrium selection is not well-deﬁned even locally, and diﬀerent selections
from the equilibrium correspondence may result in contradictory conclusions regarding
the eﬀects of dispositions. While this precludes a general analysis of imperfect observ-
ability, in the context of an example with a unique Bayesian equilibrium we show that
the population does not converge to payoﬀ-maximizing behavior even if preferences are
observed with noise.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains the development of our framework
and our main results, showing generically that dispositions do not become asymptotically
extinct under payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics. We prove this result both in the
case where the payoﬀ and disposition functions vary over a particular class of ﬁnite-
dimensional sets, as well as for the case where they vary over the inﬁnite-dimensional
set of all payoﬀ and disposition functions. In Section 3 we relax the assumption that
types are perfectly observed and assume instead that they are observed with noise. We
show, by means of a speciﬁc example, that our main results carry over to this setting.
All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The genericity of dispositions
2.1 Payoﬀs and dispositions
Two players, i and j, engage in strategic interaction. The strategy spaces of the two
players, Xi and Xj,a r eo p e ns u b s e t so fRM and RN, respectively, where, without loss
4of generality, M ≤ N.2 Typical strategies are denoted xi =( xi
1,...,x i



























































The partial derivatives of Πj and of other functions are denoted similarly.
































are the dispositions of players i and j, and τ and θ are the players’ (one-dimensional)
t y p e s ,w h i c ha r ed r a w nf r o md o m a i n sEi,Ej ⊆ R each containing a neighborhood of 0.
The introduction of dispositions then drives a wedge between the objectives of the players,
which are to maximize their perceived payoﬀs Ui and Uj, and their eventual realized
payoﬀs Πi and Πj.W ea s s u m et h a tBi and Bj are C3. Moreover, as a normalization we








j,0) ≡ 0. (2.2)
That is, a type 0 player has no disposition and simply chooses actions to maximize his
actual payoﬀ.3
Our framework captures a wide range of situations. For instance, the players might
be altruistic or spiteful, and thus care not only about their own payoﬀs but also about
their rival’s payoﬀs. To model this idea we can, as in Bester and Güth (1998) and
Possajennikov (2000), write the players’ dispositions as Bi(xi,x j,τ)=τΠj(xi,x j) and
2The restriction to two players is just for notational convenience; all of our results carry over directly
for games with an arbitrary number of players. For games with more players and more general strategy
sets, see Remarks 2 and 3 below.
3Notice that this formulation in terms of an additive disposition term is equivalent to specifying
instead that a player has preferences given by a utility function Ui(xi,x j,τ) such that Ui(xi,x j,0) ≡
Πi(xi,x j). To see this, given such a utility function simply set Bi(xi,x j,τ) ≡ Ui(xi,x j,τ) − Πi(xi,x j).
5Bj(xi,x j,θ)=θΠi(xi,x j).W h e nτ and θ are positive, the players are altruistic as they
attach positive weights to their rival’s payoﬀ,w h i l ew h e nτ and θ are negative the players
are spiteful.
Another example of this framework is concern about social status. Here suppose that
M = N = 1 (the strategies of the two players are one-dimensional) and let Πi and Πj
represent the monetary payoﬀs of the two players. Then, as in Fershtman and Weiss
(1998), we can write the dispositions as Bi(xi,x j,τ)=τσ(xi − xe) and Bj(xi,x j,θ)=
θσ(xj − xe), where σ is either a positive or a negative parameter and xe is the average
action in the population. Here the revealed preferences of the players are to maximize
the sum of their monetary payoﬀs and their social status, where the latter is linked to
the gap between the players’ own actions and the average action in the population. The
players’ types, τ and θ, represent the weights that the players attach to social status.
2.2 The evolution of dispositions
Let Γ =( Xi,Xj,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) denote the game in which players i and j choose actions
from Xi and Xj, respectively, to maximize their perceived payoﬀs, Ui(·,τ) and Uj(·,θ),
and obtain true payoﬀs Πi and Πj.I f f o r (τ,θ) t h eg a m eh a sap u r es t r a t e g yN a s h
equilibrium, let (yi(τ,θ),y j(τ,θ)) denote such an equilibrium.4 We assume for this dis-
cussion that the selection (yi(τ,θ),yj(τ,θ)) from the Nash equilibrium correspondence is

















Since we cast our analysis in an evolutionary setting, these equilibrium payoﬀs, fi and
fj, will represent ﬁtness. This formulation leads directly to a natural selection process
among diﬀerent types in the population.
To assess the evolutionary viability of various dispositions, we begin by asking which
dispositions are beneﬁcial to a player. Since we are interested in characterizing whether
having no disposition (i.e., maximizing true payoﬀs) can survive evolutionary pressures,
we introduce the following notion:
Deﬁnition 1 (Unilaterally beneﬁcial dispositions) The disposition Bi (Bj)i ss a i dt ob e
unilaterally beneﬁcial for player i (player j)i nt h eg a m eΓ if there exists τ 6=0(θ 6=0 )
such that fi(τ,0) >f i(0,0) (fj(0,θ) >f j(0,0)).
4Since the strategy spaces Xi and Xj are open, the equilibrium is interior. For a discussion of the
issues of existence and interiority of pure strategy equilibria, see Remarks 1 and 3.
5We show in the Appendix that such a selection is feasible for generic games.
6It is important to note that this deﬁnition says that a disposition is unilaterally
beneﬁcial for player i if, given that player j has no disposition (i.e., θ =0 ), there exists
some non-zero type of player i whose ﬁtness is higher than the ﬁtness of type 0.I n
particular, the deﬁnition does not require this property to hold for all types of player
i: a unilaterally beneﬁcial disposition might be beneﬁcial for some types of player i but
harmful for others.6
To study how dispositions evolve, suppose that there are two large populations of
individuals, one for each player, and with a continuum of individuals of each type. At
each point t ≥ 0 in time, this pair of populations is characterized by the pair of distribu-
tions (Tt,Θt) ∈ ∆(Ei)×∆(Ej) of (τ,θ),w h e r e∆(Ei) and ∆(Ej) denote the set of Borel
probability distributions over Ei and Ej.W ea s s u m et h a tT0 has full support over Ei and
Θ0 has full support over Ej. At each instance in time, an individual in one population is
randomly matched with an individual of the other population to play the game Γ. The







We assume that the selection dynamics are monotonically increasing in average ﬁtness.








Aj gj(Tt,θ)dΘt,A j ⊆ R Borel measurable,
(2.5)























i(τ,Θt)dTt =0 , and
Z
g
j(Tt,θ)dΘt =0 for each t. (2.7)
Equations (2.5)-(2.7) reﬂect the idea that the proportion of more successful types in the
population increases from one instance or period to another at the expense of less suc-
cessful types. This may be due to the fact that more successful individuals have more
6Consider for instance the altruism/spite example mentioned above. Suppose that fi
τ(0,0) 6=0 .
Then if a small degree of altruism (τ>0)i sb e n e ﬁcial, a small degree of spite (τ<0) would be harmful
and vice versa.
7descendants, who then inherit their parents’ preferences either genetically or by educa-
tion. An alternative explanation is that the decision rules of more successful individuals
are imitated more often.
The same mathematical formulation is also compatible with the assumption that
successful types translate into stronger inﬂuence rather than numerical proliferation.
Under this interpretation, not all individuals are matched to play in each instance of time,
and more successful individuals take part in a larger share of the economic interactions,
and so are matched to play with a higher probability.
To guarantee that the system of diﬀerential equations (2.5) has a well-deﬁned solution,
we require some additional regularity conditions on the selection dynamics as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 (Regular dynamics) Payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics are called regu-
lar if gi and gj c a nb ee x t e n d e dt ot h ed o m a i nR × Y, where Y is the set of signed Borel
measures with variational norm smaller than 2, and on this extended domain, gi and gj
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¯ is the variational
norm of the signed measure µ.
Oechssler and Riedel (2001, Lemma 3) show that regularity of the dynamics guar-






is bounded and Lip-
schitz continuous in the variational norm, which implies that for any initial distributions
(T0,Θ0), the diﬀerential equation (2.5) has a unique solution.7
To characterize the asymptotic properties of the distributions (Tt,Θt) we will use the
following notion.
Deﬁnition 3 (Asymptotic extinction) The dispositions (Bi,Bj) become asymptotically
extinct in the game Γ if (Tt,Θt) converges weakly to a unit mass at (τ,θ)=( 0 ,0) as
t →∞ .
7In addition, the boundedness of gi and gj guarantees that any set having positive probability under
the initial distributions T0 or Θ0, will have positive probability under Tt or Θt for all t.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
s i n c ew ea s s u m e dt h a tT0 and Θ0 have full support on the domains Ei and Ej,s od oTt and Θt for all t.
8Theorems 1 a n d2b e l o ws h o wt h a tgenerically dispositions do not become asymp-
totically extinct under any regular payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics. Theorem 1
applies to ﬁnite-dimensional manifolds of payoﬀ and disposition functions. Here we allow
payoﬀ and disposition functions to vary over an arbitrary ﬁnite-dimensional manifold
provided it contains a suﬃciently rich class of functions. We use these ﬁnite-dimensional
results to show in Theorem 2 that the same result holds when varying over the entire
inﬁnite-dimensional families of all thrice continuously diﬀerentiable payoﬀ and disposition
functions.
2.3 Finite-dimensional manifolds
Let ˜ G denote the space of all pairs of C3 payoﬀ functions (Πi,Πj),a n dl e t ˜ B denote
the space of all pairs of C3 disposition functions (Bi,Bj). We endow ˜ G and ˜ B with the
Whitney C3 topology, and ˜ G×˜ B with the natural product topology.8
In what follows, we will often make use of a particular class of payoﬀ functions cor-
responding to games in which each pure strategy equilibrium is locally unique. We will
slightly abuse terminology by referring to a pair of payoﬀ functions (Πi,Πj) as a game
(the strategy spaces Xi,Xj remain ﬁxed throughout).
Deﬁnition 4 (Regular games) A game is called regular if at each of its Nash equilibria












We start by considering a ﬁnite-dimensional, boundaryless submanifold G of ˜ G that







































































8Roughly, the Whitney Ck topology is the topology in which two Ck functions are close if their
values, and the values of all of their derivatives of orders up to and including k, are uniformly close. For
a formal description and discussion, see e.g. Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973). This is the appropriate
topology for our problem because it guarantees that all of the maps we work with, such as the ﬁrst order
conditions for Nash equilibria, are continuous as we vary the payoﬀ and disposition functions.

































































Using this notation, we assume that the manifold G is such that for every pair of payoﬀ
functions (Πi,Πj) ∈ G there exist open neighborhoods P,Q ⊆ RM+N+M of zero such that
(¯ Πi(·,·,p), ¯ Πj(·,·,q)) ∈ G for every (p,q) ∈ P × Q. Similarly, let v =( v1,...,v M) ∈ RM































We consider a ﬁnite-dimensional submanifold B of ˜ B such that for every (Bi,Bj) ∈ B,
there exist neighborhoods V ⊆ RM,W⊆ RN of zero such that for every (v,w) ∈ V ×W,
( ¯ Bi(·,·,·,v), ¯ Bj(·,·,·,w)) ∈ B.
While this framework and the resulting theorem allow for general combinations of sets
of payoﬀ functions G and sets of dispositions B,n o t i c et h a tw ec o u l dr e s t r i c ta t t e n t i o n
to manifolds G and B such that for each (Πi,Πj) ∈ G and for each (Bi,Bj) ∈ B,t h e
resulting game Γ has pure strategy Nash equilibria for all type proﬁles (τ,θ) in some
neighborhood of (0,0) (see also Remark 1 below).9
In this ﬁnite-dimensional setting, the natural notion of genericity is as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 ( G e n e r i c i t y )Ap r o p e r t yi ss a i dt oh o l df o rg e n e r i cc o m b i n a t i o n so fp a i r s
of payoﬀ functions in G and dispositions in B if there is an open, full-measure subset A
of the product manifold G×Bsuch that the property obtains for all (Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) ∈ A.
We can now state the ﬁrst version of our main result.
Theorem 1 For generic combinations of pairs of payoﬀ functions (Πi,Πj) ∈ G and
dispositions (Bi,Bj) ∈ B:
9Because the set of regular games having pure strategy equilibria is open, such combinations of sets
of payoﬀ functions and sets of dispositions exist.
10(i) The disposition Bi is unilaterally beneﬁcial for player i and the disposition Bj is
unilaterally beneﬁcial for player j.
(ii) The dispositions (Bi,Bj) do not asymptotically become extinct under any regular
payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics.
The basic idea behind this result can be summarized as follows. Suppose that both
players do not have dispositions, so that τ = θ =0 . The resulting Nash equilibrium of
the game Γ is therefore (yi(0,0),y j(0,0)). Introducing a slight disposition for player i
























The ﬁrst term is the direct eﬀect on i’s equilibrium payoﬀ due to the change in i’s own
behavior. The second term is the indirect eﬀect caused by the change in j’s equilibrium
behavior. For generic pairs of payoﬀs and dispositions, yi
τ(0,0) and yj
τ(0,0) are well-





j(0,0)) = 0. (2.11)
Therefore the ﬁrst, direct eﬀect vanishes. The essence of the proof is then to show that for
generic combinations of payoﬀ and disposition functions, a perturbation in i’s disposition













τ(0,0) 6=0 . (2.12)
This implies in turn that payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics cannot converge to a unit
mass at (τ,θ)=( 0 ,0). If instead the distribution of player j’s type were to become
concentrated around θ =0 , the fact that fi
τ(0,0) 6=0means that some small nonzero
value of τ (positive or negative, depending on the sign of fi
τ(0,0))i n c r e a s e st h eﬁtness
of player i. This in turn implies that a non-zero type of player i would fare better than
at y p ez e r op l a y e ri, and would therefore increase in number at the expense of the type
zero player. Thus in the limit the dispositions will not become extinct.10
Several remarks about Theorem 1 are now in order.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 is stated for general ﬁnite-dimensional manifolds of games and
dispositions, which may include games that do not have pure strategy equilibria. Notice
that in this case properties (i) and (ii) hold vacuously. As we discussed above, the theorem
instead could be stated for collections of games and dispositions for which selections of
10For symmetric games, Güth and Peleg (2001)i d e n t i ﬁe dt h ea n a l o g u eo f( 2 . 12) as a necessary condi-
tion for evolutionary stability (in contrast with the fully dynamic analysis of the current paper). However,
Güth and Peleg did not investigate the genericity of this condition.
11pure strategy equilibria exist in a neighborhood of (0,0). We state the result as above
for ease of use in extending the result to the general class of games, where the issues
involved in restricting attention to games with pure strategy equilibria are slightly more
complicated. We discuss this in more detail below.
Remark 2: Theorem 1 can be easily generalized to games with ﬁnitely many players.
In that case, the proof of the theorem applies verbatim with the index j being interpreted
as the vector of all players but i, and with N being the dimension of the product of the
strategy spaces of all players but i.
Remark 3: The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions that
obtain at interior Nash equilibria of Γ. If we allow the strategy spaces of the players,
Xi and Xj, to be closed subsets of RM and RN, then some Nash equilibria may be
on the boundary. In such a case, the analysis carries over when restricting attention
to the set of directions for which the ﬁrst-order conditions do hold at equilibrium.11
No ﬁrst-order conditions need to hold at Nash equilibrium strategies that are extreme
points in the strategy sets Xi and Xj, however. This will be the case for instance for pure
strategy Nash equilibria when Xi and Xj are simplices of mixed strategies. Such extreme
equilibria are not perturbed when the game is perturbed with a slight disposition, so the
marginal analysis in the proof does not apply in this case. In such games, types with
small dispositions may have the same ﬁtness as zero types with no disposition.
Our genericity analysis is also inappropriate for pure strategy Nash equilibria in games
with ﬁnitely many pure strategies. For such games a global analysis rather than a mar-
ginal one is appropriate for characterizing equilibria. Nonetheless, similar results may
hold in some such games. For example, in symmetric games with ﬁnitely many pure
strategies, Dekel et al. (1998) show that for any symmetric Nash equilibrium diﬀer-
ent from the payoﬀ-maximizing symmetric outcome (as, for example, in the prisoners’
dilemma), the lack of dispositions is not evolutionarily viable.
Remark 4: A similar result holds when the strategy spaces Xi and Xj are inﬁnite-
dimensional. Unfortunately, in the most obvious examples of such games, such as inﬁ-
nitely repeated games or games with incomplete information, Nash equilibria are typically
not locally unique. For inﬁnitely repeated games this follows from the Folk Theorem,
while incomplete information games typically have a continuum of Bayesian-Nash equi-
libria (see e.g., Leininger, Linhart, and Radner, 1989). In such cases, an equilibrium
selection is not well-deﬁned even locally, so when small dispositions are introduced it is
unclear which equilibrium to consider. Diﬀerent selections from the equilibrium corre-
spondence may result in contradictory conclusions regarding the eﬀects of the disposi-
11Dubey (1986) and Anderson and Zame (2001) employ a similar approach to demonstrate the generic
Pareto-ineﬃciency of “non-vertex” Nash equilibria.
12tions.12 We wish to emphasize however that this problem arises not from any inherent
limitation of the argument itself; rather, the evolutionary analysis ceases to be predictive
because the equilibrium is not locally unique.
Remark 5: Theorem 1 has an interesting implication for the strategic delegation liter-
ature. This literature has demonstrated that players can gain strategic advantage over
rivals by hiring a delegate whose preferences diﬀer from theirs to play the game on their
behalf (e.g. Green 1992; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Fershtman, Judd and Kalai 1991;
Katz 1991). Viewing the perceived payoﬀ function of player i as representing the pref-
erences of a delegate hired by player i to play the game on player i’s behalf, part (i) of
Theorem 1 implies that earlier results obtained in the strategic delegation literature are
in fact generic. That is, in almost every strategic interaction hiring a delegate whose
preferences diﬀer from the player’s own preferences is beneﬁcial to the player because of
its resulting eﬀect on opponents’ play.
2.4 All games and dispositions
The genericity result established in the previous subsection might appear to be somewhat
limited in scope because of its restriction to certain ﬁnite-dimensional submanifolds G
and B. Next we show that an analogous result holds when we vary over the inﬁnite-
dimensional sets of all possible pairs of payoﬀ functions and dispositions.
To extend our genericity results to the space of all payoﬀ and distribution functions,
we will need a notion of genericity that is suitable in an inﬁnite-dimensional setting. Un-
fortunately, there is no natural analogue of Lebesgue measure in an inﬁnite-dimensional
space, and standard topological notions of “almost all” such as open and dense or residual
are not entirely satisfactory, particularly in problems like ours in which “almost all” is
loosely interpreted in a probabilistic sense as a statement about the likelihood of partic-
ular events. For example, open and dense sets in Rn can have arbitrarily small measure,
and residual sets can have measure 0. Nevertheless, Christensen (1974) and Hunt, Sauer,
and Yorke (1992) have developed measure-theoretic analogues of Lebesgue measure 0 and
full Lebesgue measure for inﬁnite-dimensional spaces, called shyness and prevalence.
Deﬁnition 6 (Shyness and prevalence) Let Y be a topological vector space. A universally
measurable subset E ⊂ Y is shy if there is a regular Borel probability measure µ on Y with
compact support such that µ(E+y)=0for every y ∈ Y .13 A (not necessarily universally
measurable) subset F ⊂ Y is shy if it is contained in a shy universally measurable set.
As u b s e tE ⊂ Y is prevalent if its complement Y \ E is shy.
12In speciﬁc cases, however, there may be more natural candidates for such selections; see for example
the analysis in Section 3 below and in Heifetz and Segev (2003).
13As e tE ⊂ Y is universally measurable if for every Borel measure η on Y , E belongs to the completion
with respect to η of the sigma algebra of Borel sets.
13If A ⊂ Y is open, then a set E ⊂ A is relatively shy in A if E i ss h y ,a n das e t
F ⊂ A is relatively prevalent in A if A \ Y is relatively shy in A.
Christensen (1974) and Hunt, Sauer and Yorke (1992) show that shyness and preva-
lence have the properties we ought to require of measure-theoretic notions of “smallness”
and “largeness.” In particular, the countable union of shy sets is shy, no relatively open
subset is shy, prevalent sets are dense, and a subset of Rn is shy in Rn i fa n do n l yi fi th a s
Lebesgue measure 0. It is straightforward to show that the corresponding properties hold
for relatively shy and relatively prevalent subsets of an open set as well. Hunt, Sauer,
and Yorke (1992) also provide simple suﬃcient conditions for their notions of shyness and
prevalence (here we adopt the somewhat more descriptive terminology from Anderson
and Zame 2001).14
Deﬁnition 7 (Finite shyness and ﬁnite prevalence) Let Y be a topological vector space.
A universally measurable set E ⊂ Y is ﬁnitely shy if there is a ﬁnite dimensional subspace
V ⊂ Y such that (E−y)∩V has Lebesgue measure 0 in V for every y ∈ Y .Au n i v e r s a l l y
measurable set E ⊂ Y is ﬁnitely prevalent if its complement Y \ E is ﬁnitely shy.
Sets that are ﬁnitely shy are shy, hence sets that are ﬁnitely prevalent are prevalent.
Using this fact together with the results we established for ﬁnite-dimensional submani-
folds will yield a general version of our results when payoﬀs and dispositions vary over
t h ee n t i r ei n ﬁnite-dimensional spaces ˜ G and ˜ B.
We can now state a second version of our main result.
Theorem 2 There exists an open, prevalent subset P of ˜ G×˜ B such that for each
(Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) ∈ P,
(i) The disposition Bi is unilaterally beneﬁcial for player i and the disposition Bj is
unilaterally beneﬁcial for player j.
(ii) The dispositions (Bi,Bj) do not asymptotically become extinct under any regular
payoﬀ-monotonic dynamics.
In particular, let ˜ Rp ⊂ ˜ G be the set of regular games with pure strategy equilibria.
Then ˜ Rp × ˜ B contains an open, relatively prevalent subset satisfying (i) and (ii).
14Anderson and Zame (2001) have extended the work of Hunt, Sauer and Yorke (1992) and Christensen
(1974) by deﬁning prevalence and shyness relative to a convex subset that may be a shy subset of the
ambient space. Their extension is useful in many applications, particularly in economics, in which the
relevant parameters are drawn not from the whole space but from some subset, such as a convex cone or
an order interval, that may itself be a shy subset of the ambient space. Here we use the original notion
as formulated in Hunt, Sauer and Yorke (1992).
14As with Theorem 1, here too we could give other versions of this result restricted
to games with pure strategy Nash equilibria. This becomes somewhat more delicate,
however, due to the fact that the subset of ˜ G×˜ B for which each game has pure strategy
equilibria is not necessarily open, nor necessarily convex. The diﬃculty lies in extending
the notion of prevalence to a relative one. Anderson and Zame (2001) provide one such
extension, but, crucially, they require the domain to be convex. To restrict to games with
pure strategy equilbria, we have taken the simplest approach by considering the subset
˜ Rp ⊂ ˜ G of regular games with pure strategy equilibria, which is open. Then it follows
immediately that ˜ Rp × ˜ B contains an open, relatively prevalent subset satisfying (i) and
(ii) above. Alternatively, given any convex subset C ⊂ ˜ Gp, one can show that there exists
a relatively prevalent subset of C×˜ B satisfying (i) and (ii). Justifying a restriction to a
convex set of games with pure strategy equilibria seems diﬃcult, however.
3 Noisy observability of dispositions
Thus far, we have assumed that players i and j play a Nash equilibrium given their
perceived payoﬀ functions. One justiﬁcation for this assumption is that players’ perceived
payoﬀs are perfectly observed. Of course, by standard arguments, Nash equilibrium play
does not necessarily require observability of payoﬀs. If the interaction lasts several rounds,
in important classes of games play can converge to a Nash equilibrium even if players
have very limited knowledge or adapt their behavior myopically, for instance by following
some version of ﬁctitious play (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
In this section, we pursue further the possibility that preferences may not be perfectly
observed. Speciﬁcally, we assume that players observe each other’s preferences with some
randomly distributed noise. The natural solution concept for this setting is Bayesian
equilibrium. Unfortunately, as we discussed in the introduction, Bayesian equilibria
are typically not locally unique; consequently, it is impossible to generalize Theorems 1
and 2 to this setting. Nonetheless, using a speciﬁc example that gives rise to a unique
Bayesian equilibrium for any given distribution (T ,Θ) of types, we show that in the
absence of this technical obstacle, the evolutionary viability of dispositions is maintained.
Qualitatively similar results would obtain for any other example that admits a unique
Bayesian equilibrium at least in some weak neighborhood of the unit mass at (τ,θ)=
(0,0).

























j,τ , θ ∈ R. (3.2)
15Using these payoﬀ and disposition functions, the perceived payoﬀ functions are given
by
Ui(xi,x j,τ)=Πi(xi,x j)+Bi(xi,x j,τ)=( α + τ − bxj − xi)xi,
Uj(xi,x j,θ)=Πj(xi,x j)+Bi(xi,x j,θ)=( α + θ − bxi − xj)xj.
(3.3)
From (3.3) it is clear that the dispositions can be interpreted as “self-esteem” biases
reﬂecting over- and under-conﬁdence. Here the players either overestimate the return to
their own actions, if τ and θ are positive, or underestimate these returns, if τ and θ are
negative.
This example can be used to illustrate our more general results. Here, if perceived
payoﬀ functions are completely observable, then any regular payoﬀ monotonic dynamics
results in a distribution of types that converges to a unit mass at a type that is positive
as long as b 6=0 , that is, as long as the game is one with nontrivial strategic interaction.
We prove this, along with some more general results, in Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel
(2004).
To extend these results to a setting with partial observability, we assume that the
observation of opponents’ perceived payoﬀs is subject to some randomly distributed noise.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that before choosing actions players i and j receive the following
signals about each other’s types:
s
i = τ + ν,s
j = θ + ν, (3.4)
where ν is a random variable distributed on the support [−r,r] a c c o r d i n gt oac u m u l a t i v e
distribution function N with a positive density. The assumption that the support of ν is
symmetric around 0 is not essential; however, the assumption that the support is bounded
is important as it makes it possible for players to distinguish between zero and non-zero
types.15
Given the signals, si and sj, the players update their beliefs about each other’s pref-
erences, and then play a Bayesian equilibrium given these updated beliefs. In this setting
we now prove the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the players have the perceived payoﬀ functions speciﬁed
in (3.3) and they receive the signals si and sj speciﬁed in (3.4), and moreover, the
initial distributions of both τ and θ have full support. Then the dispositions do not
asymptotically become extinct under any regular payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics.
In the working paper version (Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel, 2003) we also establish
some positive convergence results for this game with noisy observability. When the sup-
ports of the initial bias distributions T0,Θ0 are conﬁned to some large enough compact
15In diﬀerent but related models, Dekel et al. (1998), Ely and Yilankaya (2001), Ok and Vega Redondo
(2001) and Güth and Peleg (2001)s h o wt h a tp a y o ﬀ-maximization is evolutionarily stable if preferences
are completely unobservable. In our setting, this would correspond to the limit case in which the noise
is distributed with an improper uniform prior on the entire real line.
16interval, then under any regular payoﬀ-monotonic dynamics the distributions Tt,Θt con-
verge weakly to a unit mass at τ∗ = θ
∗ = b2α
4+2b−b2. In particular, as in the case of full
observability, this value is nonzero as long as b 6=0 , thus as long as there is nontrivial
strategic interaction. Similar results hold if the preferences Ui,Uj are unobserved in some
fraction ρ of the interactions (in which case the corresponding Bayesian equilibrium is
played). Finally, similar results obtain in a version of this model incorporating costly
signaling of types. Here player j observes a signal mi of player i’s type τ,where player i
incurs ﬁtness cost c(mi − τ)
2 w h i c hi sc o n v e xi nt h ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h es i g n a lmi and
t h et r u et y p eτ; and analogously for player j. Now the distributions of type-signal pairs
(τ,mi) and (θ,mj) evolve according to some regular payoﬀ-monotonic dynamics. Then
these distributions converge to a unit mass at values that are nonzero as long as b 6=0 .
For details and more discussion of all of these results, see Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel
(2004).
4C o n c l u s i o n
The literature on the evolution of preferences, while successful in providing foundations
for various types of dispositions and biases, is often criticized on two important grounds
(see e.g., Samuelson, 2001). First, speciﬁc results typically consider preferences and
dispositions that are carefully tailored to the particular game of interest, which raises
the question of how robust such speciﬁc examples are and whether they extend to more
general types of preferences and dispositions. Second, most of the existing work modeling
the evolution of preferences assumes that preferences are perfectly observed, while it is
unclear whether this assumption is reasonable or whether the results obtained still hold
if this assumption is relaxed.
Our work addresses both of these questions. Under the assumption that preferences
are observable, we show that in almost every game and for almost every type of distortion
of a player’s actual payoﬀs, some positive or negative extent of this distortion is beneﬁcial
to the player because of the resulting eﬀect on opponents’ play. Hence, any standard evo-
lutionary process in which selection dynamics are monotone in payoﬀs will not eliminate
such distortions; in particular, under any such selection dynamics, the population will
not converge to payoﬀ maximizing behavior. This implies in turn that the evolutionary
viability of dispositions is generic, and independent of the particular parametric models
employed in most of the literature. We also show that the viability of dispositions may
be robust to noisy observability of preferences. Although the lack of local uniqueness of
Bayesian equilibria in models in which preferences are observed with noise precludes a
general extension of our results, when the Bayesian equilibrium is unique, dispositions
remain evolutionarily viable in such settings in the sense that the population still does
not converge to payoﬀ maximizing behavior.
175 Appendix
In order to prove Theorems 1 a n d2w ep r o c e e dw i t has e q u e n c eo fl e m m a t a .W em a k e
repeated use of the following standard deﬁnition and theorem, which we include here for
completeness.16
Deﬁnition 8 (regular value) Let X and S be boundaryless, Cr manifolds, and G : X ×
S → RK be a Cr function, where r ≥ 1.A ne l e m e n ty ∈ RK is a regular value of G if
for all (x,s) such that G(x,s)=y, the derivative Dx,sG(x,s) has rank K.
In particular, notice that if there are no points (x,s) such that G(x,s)=y,t h e ny is
trivially a regular value of G.
Remark 6: In the arguments below we will frequently need to show that zero is a regular
value of various maps. To this end we will rely on two useful observations. First, we
will repeatedly use the assumption that these manifolds contain an open set around each
point consisting of a particular type of perturbation. More precisely, ﬁx (Πi,Πj) ∈ G
and recall that we assume that there exist open neighborhoods P,Q ⊆ RM+N+M of zero
such that (¯ Πi(·,·,p), ¯ Πj(·,·,q)) ∈ G for each (p,q) ∈ P × Q,w h e r e¯ Πi and ¯ Πj are given
in (2.8). Now let h : Xi × Xj ×G→ RK be an arbitrary C1 function. Then zero is
ar e g u l a rv a l u eo fh provided Dh(xi,x j,Πi,Πj) has rank K (i.e., is surjective) for each
(xi,x j,Πi,Πj) ∈ h−1(0). Given our assumptions about G, to show that Dh(xi,x j,Πi,Πj)

















does not have rank K for any (xi,x j) ∈ Xi × Xj, then zero can be a regular value of
h(·,·,Πi,Πj) only if h(xi,x j,Πi,Πj) 6=0for all (xi,x j) ∈ Xi × Xj.
Theorem 3 (The transversality theorem).L e tX and S be ﬁnite-dimensional, bound-
aryless, Cr manifolds and G : X×S → RK be a Cr function, where r>max {0,dim X−
K}.F o r e a c h s ∈ S let G(·,s) be the restriction of G to X ×{ s}.I f y ∈ RK is
ar e g u l a rv a l u eo fG, then for almost every s ∈ S, y is a regular value of G(·,s).
In addition, if s 7→ G(·,s) is continuous in the Whitney Cr topology, then {s ∈ S :
s is a regular value of G(·,s)} is open.
16For example, see Hirsch (1976).
18The ﬁrst step in our argument is to show that equilibria are locally unique in almost
all games. This follows from the genericity of regular games, established in Lemma 1,
and the local uniqueness of equilibria in regular games, established in Lemma 2.
Lemma 1 The set of regular games R is an open, full-measure subset of G.
Proof. Fix a game (Πi,Πj) ∈ G. Since the strategy spaces Xi,Xj are open, Nash
equilibria of the game are interior. Thus, at each Nash equilibrium (yi,y j) of the game,
































where IM and IN are the M × M and N × N identity matrices. Since the matrix has
rank M + N for each (yi,y j), it follows from Remark 6 that zero is a regular value of φ.
Therefore, the transversality theorem implies that there is a set of full measure R ⊂ G
such that zero is a regular value of φ(·,·,Πi,Πj) for each game (Πi,Πj) ∈ R.F o r e a c h
(Πi,Πj) ∈ R, the deﬁnition of regular value and the fact that zero is a regular value of
















has full rank M + N at each Nash equilibrium (yi,yj) of (Πi,Πj).T h u s , u s i n g t h e
deﬁnition of a regular game, a game (Πi,Πj) ∈ G is regular if and only if 0 is a regular
value of φ(·,·,Πi,Πj),t h a ti s ,R = R.T h u sR has full measure.
Finally, since the map (Πi,Πj) 7→ φ(·,·,Πi,Πj) is continuous in the Whitney C1
topology, R is open by the transversality theorem.
The next lemma shows that in a regular game, the Nash equilibrium correspondence
is locally single-valued in a neighborhood of zero. This feature allows us to study the
eﬀects of small dispositions on the true equilibrium payoﬀsi naw e l l - d e ﬁned manner.
19Lemma 2 Consider a regular game (Πi,Πj) and let (yi,y j) be a Nash equilibrium of the
game. For any pair of dispositions (Bi,Bj) ∈ B, there is a neighborhood V0 of τ =0
and a unique C1 function
Z(·) ≡ (y
i (·,0),y
j(·,0)) : V0 → X
i × X
j,
such that (yi (0,0),y j(0,0)) = (yi,y j) and (yi (τ,0),y j(τ,0)) i saN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h e























Proof. Suppose that θ =0(player j has no disposition), so that Bj(·,·,0) ≡ 0.T h e n
a Nash equilibrium (yi (τ,0),y j (τ,0)) of the game (Πi + Bi,Πj) satisﬁes the following










Since Bi(·,·,0) ≡ 0, Bi




















The implicit function theorem then implies that the Nash equilibrium map Z(·) ≡
(yi (·,0),y j(·,0)) is locally deﬁned and C1 in a neighborhood V0 of τ =0 .F i n a l l y ,
since Bi(·,·,0) ≡ 0, Bi
ii(yi,y j,0) = Bi
ij(yi,yj,0) ≡ 0.T h e n( A . 1) follows by diﬀerentiat-
ing (A.2) with respect to τ and evaluating at τ =0 .












j × R → R
2|(Π
i,Π





























By Lemma 1,t h es e tUR ≡ R×Bis an open, full-measure subset of U.
20Lemma 3 There is an open, full-measure subset UB ⊆ UR of perceived payoﬀ functions
(Ui,Uj) for which Bi
iτ(yi,yj,0) 6=0at each Nash equilibrium (yi,y j) of (Πi,Πj).





















































has rank M + N + M at each Nash equilibrium (yi,y j) of (Πi,Πj).C o n s e q u e n t l y , b y
Remark 6, zero is a regular value of ξ. Therefore, the transversality theorem implies
that there is a full-measure subset UB ⊆ UR such that zero is a regular value of the map
ξ(·,·,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) for all (Πi + Bi,Πj + Bj) ∈ UB.S i n c e t h e m a p (Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) 7→
ξ(·,·,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) is continuous in the Whitney C1 topology, UB is open by the transver-
sality theorem as well.























has only M+N columns, it cannot have rank M+N +M for any (xi,x j) ∈ Xi×Xj.B y
Remark 6, zero can be a regular value of ξ(·,·,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) only if ξ(xi,x j,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) 6=
0 for all (xi,x j) ∈ Xi × Xj. Therefore, at a (interior) Nash equilibrium (yi,yj) of the

















ji(xi,x j,0) has rank M − k, it takes k consecutive ﬁrst-order perturbations (of its
diagonal entries, for example) to produce a matrix of full rank. This idea is formalized
in the following lemma.
21Lemma 4 For each k =0 ,...,M there is an open, full-measure subset Uk ⊆ UB such











at each Nash equilibrium (yi,y j) of (Πi,Πj).
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. For the base case k =0 , we claim that for











This follows because the determinant of ˜ Π
j
ji(·,·) is a sum of products, of M factors each,
and the derivative with respect to (q3
1,...,q 3
M) of each of these products is zero with the















































Now suppose that the claim holds for k =   − 1. Then we claim there is an open,
full-measure subset U  ⊆ U −1 such that for games (Πi,Πj) that correspond to perceived




































































has rank M +N + 1 at each Nash equilibrium (yi,yj) of the game (Πi,Πj) ∈ PrG(U −1).
Consequently, by Remark 6, zero is a regular value of ψ. Therefore, the transversality
theorem implies that there exists a set of full measure U  ⊂ U −1 such that zero is a regular
value of ψ(·,·,Πi,Πj) for each (Πi,Πj) ∈ PrG(U ).S i n c et h em a p(Πi,Πj) 7→ ψ(·,·,Πi,Πj)
is continuous in the Whitney C1 topology, U  is an open subset of UM by the transversality
theorem.
Lemma 5 Let (Ui,Uj) ∈ UM, (Πi,Πj)=P r G(Ui,Uj) and (Bi,Bj)=P r B(Ui,Uj).F o r
every Nash equilibrium (yi,y j) of (Πi,Πj), yj
τ(0,0) 6=0 .
Proof. Let (Ui,Uj) ∈ UM, (Πi,Πj)=P r G(Ui,Uj) and (Bi,Bj)=P r B(Ui,Uj).
Let (yi,y j) be a Nash equilibrium of (Πi,Πj). Now recall from Lemma 4 that for




















ji(yi,y j) has rank M.
































and suppose by way of contradiction that yj
τ(0,0) = 0.S i n c e Π
j
ji(yi,y j) has rank M,i t
is injective. Then since yj
τ(0,0) = 0, (A.7a) implies that yi
τ(0,0) = 0. Recalling from
L e m m a3t h a t−Bi
iτ(yi,y j,0) 6=0 , this means that (A.7b) cannot hold, a contradiction.
23Lemma 6 There is an open, full-measure subset U∗ ⊆ UM such that if (Πi,Πj)=
PrG(Ui,Uj) and (Bi,Bj)=P r B(Ui,Uj) for some (Ui,Uj) ∈ U∗, then for every Nash








Proof. Fix (Πi,Πj) ∈ ˜ G and (Bi,Bj) ∈ ˜ B.F o re a c h(xi,x j) ∈ Xi × Xj and for each































































For the remainder of the argument, we restrict ζ to the set UM deﬁn e di nL e m m a
4. Fix (Πi,Πj) ∈ PrG(UM) and (Bi,Bj) ∈ PrB(UM);b yd e ﬁnition (Πi,Πj) is a regular














































































By Lemma 5, yj




























has rank M+N+1. Consequently, by Remark 5, zero is a regular value of ζ. Therefore,
by the transversality theorem, there is a full-measure subset U∗ ⊂ UM such that zero is
ar e g u l a rv a l u eo fζ(·,·,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) for all (Πi + Bi,Πj + Bj) ∈ U∗.S i n c e t h e m a p
(Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) 7→ ζ(·,·,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) is continuous in the Whitney C1 topology, U∗ is
an open subset of UM by the transversality theorem.






























has only M +N columns, it cannot have rank M +N +1. B yR e m a r k5 ,z e r oc a nb ea
regular value of ζ(·,·,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) only if ζ(xi,x j,Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) 6=0for all (xi,x j) ∈
Xi × Xj.T h u si f(Πi,Πj) ∈ PrG(U∗) and (yi,y j) is a (interior) Nash equilibrium of the
game (Πi,Πj),s ot h a tΠi
i(yi,y j)=Π
j
















Lemma 7 For perceived payoﬀs (Ui,Uj) ∈ U∗, fi
τ(0,0) 6=0 .
















25where (yi,y j) is a Nash equilibrium of (Πi,Πj).H e n c e Πi
i(yi,yj)=0 . By Lemma 6,
Πi
j(yi,y j)yj
τ(0,0) 6=0 . Hence fi
τ(0,0) 6=0 .
Next, consider the “ﬁtness” game in which players i and j choose their types, τ and
θ, to maximize their ﬁtness, fi(τ,θ) and fj(τ,θ). Note that Lemma 7 shows that for
perceived payoﬀs (Ui,Uj) ∈ U∗, the proﬁle (τ,θ)=( 0 ,0) is not a Nash equilibrium
of this ﬁtness game, since fi
τ(0,0) 6=0means that player i’s best response to θ =0is
nonzero. Moreover, this will be enough to allow us to conclude that the dispositions do not
become asymptotically extinct under any regular payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics,
as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 8 If the dispositions (Bi,Bj) become asymptotically extinct in the game Γ,t h e n
the types (τ,θ)=( 0 ,0) are a Nash equilibrium of the ﬁtness game.
Proof. Let δ0 denote the unit mass at (0,0). Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that (τ,θ)=( 0 ,0) is not a Nash equilibrium of the ﬁtness game. Then without loss
of generality, for some τ 6=0we have fi(τ,0) >f i(0,0). Since fi is continuous, there
exists a neighborhood A of the unit mass at 0 and neighborhoods V0 of 0 and Vτ of




fi(ˆ τ,θ)dΘt.N o w
since (Bi,Bj) becomes asymptotically extinct, there exists t0 suﬃciently large so that for




fi(ˆ τ,θ)dΘt for any
˜ τ ∈ Vτ and ˆ τ ∈ V0. Because the dynamics are regular, Tt and Θt have full support for
each t (see footnote 7). Then, using (2.6), the growth rates satisfy gi(˜ τ,Θt) >g i(ˆ τ,Θt)
for every t ≥ t0, ˜ τ ∈ Vτ and ˆ τ ∈ V0 as well. By (2.5), this implies that for t ≥ t0 we
have d
dtTt(V˜ τ) > d
dtTt(V0). This means that Tt does not converge weakly to a unit mass at
τ =0 , a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 7 proves the existence of an open, full-measure set of
perceived payoﬀs U∗ such that Bi is unilaterally beneﬁcial to player i. An analogous proof
establishes the existence of an open, full-measure set of perceived payoﬀs U∗∗ such that
Bj is unilaterally beneﬁcial to player j. Part (i) of the theorem follows by observing that
the intersection of U∗ and U∗∗ is also an open and full-measure set of perceived payoﬀs.
As for part (ii), Lemma 7 implies that for perceived payoﬀsi nU∗, (τ,θ)=( 0 ,0) is not a
Nash equilibrium of the ﬁtness game, and by Lemma 8 it follows that for (Ui,Uj) ∈ U∗,
the dispositions (Bi,Bj)=P r B (Ui,Uj) do not become asymptotically extinct in the
game (Πi,Πj)=P r G (Ui,Uj). ¥













is regular and 0 is a regular value of ζ}
By the arguments in Lemmas 6 and 7, every (Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) ∈ P satisﬁes part (i) of the
t h e o r e m ,a n db yL e m m a8i ta l s os a t i s ﬁes part (ii).
26It remains to show that P is ﬁnitely prevalent in ˜ G×˜ B. To this end, we ﬁrst claim
that P is open. This follows from the fact that the set of regular games ˜ R is open in
˜ G×˜ B, that the set of functions in C1(Xi×Xj,RM+N+1) transverse to {0} is open in the





























































































Now by Theorem 1, for every (Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj) ∈ ˜ G×˜ B, [(V×W )+( Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj)]∩P
has full measure in V×W . Equivalently, (P − (Πi,Πj,Bi,Bj)) ∩ (V×W ) has full
measure in V×W.T h u s P is ﬁnitely prevalent. Since ﬁnitely prevalent sets are
prevalent, the proof is complete. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Before choosing their actions, the players observe the signals
si and sj, but not the true types τ and θ. Player i with type τ and signal si chooses an
action xi so as to maximize the expected perceived payoﬀ






where the expectation is taken over players j who produced the signal sj when they meet
somebody with signal si, and χj(si,s j) is the (current) average action of these players.
Player j’s problem is analogous.
The best-responses of players i and j against χj(si,s j) and χi(si,s j), respectively, are
x
i =




α + θ − bχi(si,s j)
2
. (A.9)
27Let τ(si) be the (current) average type of player i who produces the signal si and let θ(sj)
be the (current) average type of player j who produces the signal sj. Taking expectations











α + θ(sj) − bχi(si,s j)
2
.





2α +2 θ(sj) − αb − bτ(si)




2α +2 τ(si) − αb − bθ(sj)
4 − b2 .
Substituting this in (A.9) reveals that the equilibrium actions of players i and j are
b x
i =











The (current) average ﬁtness of player i with type τ and signal si when meeting player










2α +2 θ(sj) − αb − bτ(si)
4 − b2 −











Now, suppose that Θt c o n v e r g e st oau n i tm a s sa t0. We will show that it is impossible
for Tt to also converge to a unit mass at 0.S i n c eΘt c o n v e r g e st oau n i tm a s sa t0,t h e n
the posterior belief of player i regarding player j’s type, θ(sj),a l s oc o n v e r g e st oau n i t









α(2 − b) − bτ(si)
4 − b2 −



































Now suppose by way of contradiction that Tt also converges to a unit mass at 0.
If player i produces a signal si ∈ [−r,r],t h e np l a y e rj cannot rule out the possibility
that player i’s type is τ =0 . Therefore, τ(si) converges to 0 for all si ∈ [−r,r].N o w ,
consider player i whose type τ is positive but close to 0 (the argument when τ is negative
and close to 0 is analogous). With probability N(r − τ), the player produces a signal
28si ∈ [−r + τ,r]. Given such a signal, player j cannot rule out the possibility that player















With probability 1 − N(r − τ), the player produces a signal si ∈ (r,r +τ].I nt h a tc a s e ,
player j realizes that player i’s type cannot be 0 and is bounded from below by si − r.
Since τ>0, fi (τ,si) is increasing in τ(si). Consequently, the overall average ﬁtness of
player i with type τ will be bounded from below asymptotically by
















































Thus asymptotically some τ>0 dominates τ =0 . The disposition is therefore unilater-
ally beneﬁcial to player i, which implies that Tt cannot converge to a unit mass at τ =0
under any regular payoﬀ-monotonic selection dynamics. ¥
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